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Abstract—Based on Petri net modelling and linear logic as formal 
framework, ESA PetriNet allows to carry out dependability 
analysis of discrete (based on temporal Petri nets modelling) or 
hybrid systems (differential predicate-transition Petri nets 
modelling). ESA PetriNet implements the approach for critical 
scenarios deriving. The approach is based on a qualitative 
analysis of Petri net model. It consists in determining a sequence 
of events represented by transition firings in the Petri net model 
that leads the system from normal working to critical situation. 
ESA PetriNet allows deriving only pertinent scenarios. 
Minimality of these scenarios (composed by the necessary events) 
is introduced to facilite the analysis step. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
To address reliability of dynamic systems [1], some 
approaches are based on the deriving of feared scenarios. 
These approaches consist on determining the sequences of 
events that lead a system to a critical situation. 
Our approach is focused on the search for feared scenarios. 
In order to propose a way to avoid the problem of state space 
explosion, the basic idea is to use a Petri net model and 
directly extract the feared scenario without building the 
accessibility graph [2]. 
Based on Petri net model [3], a qualitative analysis allows 
determining a partial order of transition firings and extracting 
feared scenarios. The analysis is focalized on the parts of the 
model that are interesting for reliability analysis [4], avoiding 
the exploration of the global system. 
The identification of feared scenarios can be helpful for the 
designer. It allows understanding the system failure reasons in 
order to establish the redundancy mechanisms and the 
reconfigurations. 
ESA PetriNet (Extraction Scenarios Analysis) is a software 
tool which implements our algorithm to extract critical 
scenarios. This paper gives, shortly, the principles of the 
algorithm implemented in ESA PetriNet and overviews of tool 
capabilities, and applications. 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the 
discrete deriving feared scenarios algorithm and the 
continuous scenarios extraction algorithm. Section 3 describes 
ESA PetriNet tool. Section 4 gives a short example of 
application and section 5 draws conclusions and future works. 
II. SCENARIO EXTRACTION ALGORITHM 
A feared scenario is a set of events (transition firings for a 
Petri net model) verifying a partial order and leading from one 
partial state corresponding to normal behaviour (partial 
marking) to another one that represents a dangerous situation 
of the system. This situation can represent a degraded 
operating mode or a failure of the system. 
A. Discrete Scenario Deriving Algorithm 
The algorithm is based on a qualitative analysis stemming 
from the Petri net model. The objective is to extract and 
clearly identify the feared scenarios starting from a model that 
contains the necessary knowledge to make the analysis. In this 
model, normal and abnormal states are defined. 
The initial partial knowledge of the feared state is 
progressively enriched while analyzing the components 
necessary to its occurrence. This algorithm is made up of two 
steps: a backward and a forward reasoning process. The 
backward reasoning starts from the partial feared state in order 
to derive the events that are necessary to reach it, and gives 
the last nominal (normal) states preceding the critical 
behaviour. The forward reasoning starts from these nominal 
states, and determines the components at the origin of the 
feared scenario. To determine the complete context in which 
the feared scenario occurs, the concept of context enrichment 
is introduced. The context enrichment is carried out by adding 
tokens to some places (empty input places of potentially 
enabled transitions) that can have an impact on the feared 
scenario that is being explored. 
B. Continuous Scenario Deriving Algorithm 
The continuous algorithm is developed for hybrid systems 
analysis [5]. It combines the initial algorithm (discrete 
scenario deriving algorithm) and a differential equation solver 
to handle the continuous part. The Petri net model used is 
differential predicate-transition Petri net proposed in [6]. The 
Petri net model describes the operation modes, the failures and 
the reconfiguration mechanisms. The differential equations 
represent the evolution of continuous variables of the 
energetic part of the system. 
The principle of the continuous deriving of feared scenario 
algorithm consists on coupling two simulators. The first one 
simulates the Petri net (deriving scenario algorithm) and the 
second simulates the differential equations systems 
(integrator). The two simulators evolve alternatively and are 
synchronized by the events. 
The discrete algorithm determines, according to the discrete 
state of the system, the equations to be integrated and the 
thresholds to be supervised. The continuous simulator is 
called and integrates the equations until all the thresholds of 
the enabled transitions are reached. Then, the simulator 
transmits the dates to the algorithm, which runs according to 
the transmitted firing dates. The algorithm uses these dates to 
determine the evolution of the discrete state and updates the 
new system of equations to be integrated. 
 
 
Fig. 1 ESA PetriNet screen snapshot 
III. TOOL PRESENTATION 
In this part, we present the new tool (Fig. 1) which allows 
the extraction of critical scenarios from a Petri nets model. 
A. Input Files 
The input files of the tool correspond to a textual 
description of the temporal Petri net model of the system. The 
tool TINA (TIme Petri Net Analyzer) [7] is used for Petri net 
model description and its structural analysis. This structural 
analysis is necessary because it gives the marking invariants 
which allow or not the marking enrichments [4]. 
In the case of the hybrid version of ESA PetriNet, a second 
type of file must be specified. It contains differential equation 
associated with each place and so describes the continuous 
dynamic of the system. 
B. Minimality Analysis 
The final objective is to determine all minimal scenarios (to 
guarantee minimality and completeness). Indeed, one scenario 
can lead to a feared state and contain events (that are the 
consequence of another events of the scenario), which are not 
strictly necessary to reach the final feared state. So to restrict 
the derived scenarios to minimal ones, based on the definition 
of minimal scenario [8], ESA PetriNet generates only minimal 
scenarios which are of major interest to the designer. 
C. Precedence Graphs: the Feared Scenarios 
Once all the input files are specified, the tool provides the 
feared scenarios in the form of precedence graphs after the 
research of critical scenarios and the minimality analysis. This 
representation is very appropriate because it shows clearly the 
sequences of events and the parallelism. 
IV. CASE STUDY 
In this part, a short case study presents an application of a 
feared scenarios research with the tool ESA PetriNet. 
A. Presentation 
The chosen example to illustrate the approach is based on a 
volume regulation system of two tanks (Fig. 2). It consists of a 
controller, two pumps, three electrovalves, two volume 
sensors, the two regulated tanks and a third tank for draining. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Case study 
The volume of each tank must be kept inside the interval 
[Vimin, Vimax]. The volume is regulated by the controller, which 
decides, according to the values given by the volume sensors, 
to fill (or not) the concerned tank by opening (or not) the 
electrovalve. In the case of the volume reaches Vil, due to a 
failure of the electrovalve i, the controller tries to open the 
relief electrovalve for draining the concerned tank until the 
volume becomes lower than Vimin. If the volume reaches Vis, 
the tank overflows: which corresponds exactly to the studied 
critical situation. 
To simplify the problem, we consider that only the 
electrovalves can have failures. And in this paper, we focus 
only on the discrete approach. 
B. Modelling 
In order to find the feared scenarios with ESA PetriNet, we 
must model the system. We propose 3 object classes for the 
modelling: one tank class and two electrovalve classes. Using 
the formalism of temporal Petri net, we defined two objects 
(tank1 and tank2) instances of tank class (Fig. 3), two objects 
(EV1 and EV2) instances of the first electrovalve class (Fig. 4) 
and one object (EVS) instance of the third class (Fig. 5). In 
this paper, we will not explain in details the modelling. Only 
some important points will be given. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Model of the tank 1 
In the tank model, the three transitions T11, T14 and T13 
will respectively allow the use of EV1, allow the use of EVS in 
the case of EV1 failure, and represent the overflow of the tank. 
The thresholds [1,1], [2,2] and [3,3] define like a priority 
between these three transitions. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Model of the electrovalve 1 (EV1) 
The electrovalve EV1 is used when the transition t11 is 
called. It can fail when def1 is fired, in this case the 
electrovalve is out of service and t11 cannot be called. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Model of the relief electrovalve (EVS) 
Concerning the relief electrovalve, it can be free for use 
(place EV3_OK marked) or can be used by only one of the 
two tanks at the same time (place EV3_oc1 for tank1 and 
place EV3_oc2 for tank2), the other tank haven’t access to 
EVS until it become free another time. 
Thus, five objects are defined and modelled. In order to 
build a consistency model of the system, we mustn’t forget to 
specify the communication between these objects. This is 
done throw the communication file given in the Fig. 6. Just to 
give one example, the first information of this file shows that 
the transition T11 of tank1 called the transition t11 of EV1. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Communication file 
C. Use of ESA PetriNet: the Feared Scenarios 
The model of the system is ready, with all the normal states 
specified (through the label ‘N’) and a partial critical state 
defined (place E_red1 marked, representing the overflow of 
the tank 1). Thus, ESA PetriNet can be used for extracting the 
feared scenarios. The Fig. 1 gives a screen snapshot of the tool 
just after the generation of the feared scenarios. Two scenarios 
are identified. 
The first one, in Fig. 7, is composed by the events: failure 
of the electrovalve EV1, failure of the relief electrovalve EVS, 
followed by the overflow of tank 1. 
 
 
Fig. 7 Feared scenario 1 
The second scenario, in Fig. 8, is composed by the events: 
failure of the electrovalve EV1, failure of EV2, use of EVS to 
drain the tank 2, followed by the overflow of tank 1 which 
doesn’t have access to the relief electrovalve EVS. 
 
 
Fig. 8 Feared scenario 2 
D. Exploitation of the Results 
The approach makes it possible to highlight the interactions 
between the different components that are implicated in the 
feared scenarios. It shows the sharing of the relief electrovalve 
between the two tanks and the competition between the 
release of this resource by one of the two tanks and the 
overflow of the other one. 
The designer is informed that there are only these two 
scenarios which lead to the overflow of the tank 1, 
considering the failures of the three electrovalves. Thus, he 
can note that only one failure of one electrovalve doesn’t lead 
the system in the critical situation. The only possibilities 
which lead to the overflow of the tank 1 are with a minimum 
of two defective electrovalves. So, the designer can evaluate 
the dependability of the system and his reconfiguration 
mechanism with one relief electrovalve. He can be satisfied 
with the results or, if he doesn’t, can propose new system 
architecture in order to improve the dependability of the 
system. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The tool (ESA PetriNet) presented in this paper is based on 
the modelling of embedded systems by temporal or hybrid 
Petri net. Oriented object concepts are introduced to facilitate 
system modelling and scenario analysis. Indeed, by exploiting 
the object independence principle, a global analysis problem 
is decomposed into a set of local object analysis. 
ESA PetriNet allows deriving, from this Petri net model, 
scenarios leading to feared states. It allows, starting from a 
feared state, to go back through the chain of causality and to 
point out all the possible scenarios leading to a feared state. 
Each scenario is given by a partial order between the events 
necessary to the occurrence of the feared event. 
The tool allows generating only pertinent scenarios. It takes 
into account the notion of minimal scenario which is the 
relevant information for designers. 
Future work concerns the quantitative analysis. Monte 
Carlo simulation is a technique that will be used to achieve 
quantitative analysis and will be implemented in ESA 
PetriNet. 
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